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Showing posts with label Energy Terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Energy Terrorism. Show all posts

US agencies: Industrial control system malware discovered - When the lights go out

 

US agencies: Industrial control system malware discovered

Multiple U.S. government agencies have issued a joint alert announcing the discovery of malicious cyber tools capable of gaining “full system access” to multiple industrial control systems

BOSTON -- Multiple U.S. government agencies issued a joint alert Wednesday warning of the discovery of a suite of malicious cyber tools created by unnamed advanced threat actors that are capable of sabotaging the energy sector and other critical industries.

The public alert from the Energy and Homeland Security Departments, the FBI and National Security Agency did not name the actors or offer details on the find. But their private sector cybersecurity partners said the evidence suggests Russia is behind the industrial control system-disrupting tools — and that they were configured to initially target North American energy concerns.

One of the cybersecurity firms involved, Mandiant, called the tools “exceptionally rare and dangerous.”

In a report, it called the tools' functionality was “consistent with the malware used in Russia's prior physical attacks” though it acknowledged that the evidence linking it to Moscow is “largely circumstantial.”

The CEO of another government partner, Robert M. Lee of Dragos, agreed that a state actor almost certainly crafted the malware, which he said was configured to initially target liquified natural gas and electric power sites in North America.

Lee referred questions on the state actor's identity to the U.S. government and would not explain how the malware was discovered other than to say it was caught "before an attack was attempted.”

“We’re actually one step ahead of the adversary. None of us want them to understand where they screwed up,” said Lee. “Big win.”

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which published the alert, declined to identify the threat actor.

The U.S. government has warned critical infrastructure industries the gird for possible cyberattacks from Russia as retaliation for severe economic sanctions imposed on Moscow in response to its Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.

Officials have said that Russian hacker interest in the U.S. energy sector is particularly high, and CISA urged it in a statement Wednesday to be especially mindful of the mitigation measures recommended in the alert. Last month, the FBI issued an alert saying Russian hackers have scanned at least five unnamed energy companies for vulnerabilities.

Lee said the malware was “designed to be a framework to go after lots of different types of industries and be leveraged multiple times. Based on the configuration of it, the initial targets would be LNG and electric in North America.”

Mandiant said the tools pose the greatest threat to Ukraine, NATO members and other states assisting Kyiv in its defense against Russian military aggression.

It said the malware could be used to shut down critical machinery, sabotage industrial processes and disable safety controllers, leading to the physical destruction of machinery that could lead to the loss of human lives. It compared the tools to Triton, malware traced to a Russian government research institute that targeted critical safety systems and twice forced the emergency shutdown of a Saudi oil refinery in 2017 and to Industroyer, the malware that Russian military hackers used the previous year to trigger a power outage in Ukraine.

Lee said the newly discovered malware, dubbed Pipedream, is only the seventh such malicious software to be identified that is designed to attack industrial control systems.

Lee said Dragos, which specializes in industrial control system protection, identified and analyzed its capability in early 2022 as part of its normal business research and in collaboration with partners.

He would offer no more specifics. In addition to Dragos and Mandiant, the U.S. government alert offers thanks to Microsoft, Palo Alto Networks and Schneider Electric for their contributions.

Schneider Electric is one of the manufacturers listed in the alert whose equipment is targeted by the malware. Omron is another.

Mandiant said it had analyzed the tools in early 2002 with Schneider Electric.

In a statement, Palo Alto Networks executive Wendi Whitmore said: ““We’ve been warning for years that our critical infrastructure is constantly under attack. Today’s alerts detail just how sophisticated our adversaries have gotten.”

Microsoft had no comment.

—-

AP writer Alan Suderman contributed from Richmond, Virginia

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PG&E Vendor Federal Indictments with near complete access and to Windows Servers

CRITICAL PG&E VENDOR 

INFRASTRUCTURE INDICTED 

Would somebody tell the Honorable JudgeAlsup.com as Federal Court Monitor Kirkland and Ellis deliberately obfuscated the efforts of Pete Bennett regarding violations of Probation

NOTE: 


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, September 13, 2021

California Software Company Executives Charged In Conspiracy To Defraud The Tennessee Valley Authority

Company Allegedly Sought More Than $300,000 in Fraudulent Incentive Payments from TVA Through Software Installation in Rutherford County Schools

NASHVILLE – A seven-count indictment unsealed Friday charged two Danville, California men with conspiracy to defraud the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of more than $300,000, announced Acting U.S. Attorney Mary Jane Stewart for the Middle District of Tennessee. 

Anthony Gigliotti, 74, the CEO of Autonomic Software, Inc., (Autonomic) was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, three counts of mail fraud, and three counts of wire fraud.  Alexander Gigliotti, 36, the Vice President of Autonomic, was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  Both were arrested by U.S. Marshals in Danville, California on Friday and will appear in the Middle District of Tennessee at a later date for further proceedings. 

According to the indictment, Autonomic was a software company located in Danville, California, which provided a variety of software to private and public sector organizations.  In 2016, Autonomic installed power management software in Rutherford County school systems, in connection with TVA’s EnergyRight program, an incentive-based program designed to save energy and reduce costs through the installation of energy-saving software.  To be eligible for the energy conservation funds, customers were required to pay a portion of the software materials costs.

Instead of following the program requirements, Autonomic represented to the Rutherford County School District that schools would not incur any costs associated with the software installation.  Following the installation of the software, Autonomic submitted 47 invoices, totaling $588,240 to Lockheed Martin, the contract administrator of the EnergyRight program.  The invoices were made out to Rutherford County Schools and represented that each school incurred costs associated with Autonomic’s software installation.

Alexander Gigliotti also sent an email to a Lockheed Martin representative in support of seeking the incentive payments from TVA, with a breakdown of an invoice regarding purported costs incurred by Rutherford County Schools, claiming that the school paid $22 per computer related to software and $8 per computer related to support.  In fact, Rutherford County Schools did not incur any costs associated with any invoice from Autonomic.  Lockheed Martin then mailed incentive payments to Autonomic that corresponded to each invoice.

The Autonomic software failed to function as initially represented and approximately one year after the installation, Rutherford County Schools purchased energy saving software that could effectively quantify energy savings and which cost substantially less than Autonomic’s total purported materials costs.

The indictment also alleges that Anthony Gigliotti lied to TVA agents by falsely stating that Alexander Gigliotti was not involved in any of the previous TVA or school system work. 

If convicted, the defendants face up to 20 years in prison.

This case was investigated by the TVA Office of Inspector General and is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara Beth Myers.

An indictment is merely an accusation.  The defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. 

# # # # #

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California Software Company Executives Charged In Conspiracy To Defraud The Tennessee Valley Authority

Department of Justice
U.S. Attorney’s Office
Middle District of Tennessee

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, September 13, 2021

California Software Company Executives Charged In Conspiracy To Defraud The Tennessee Valley Authority

Company Allegedly Sought More Than $300,000 in Fraudulent Incentive Payments from TVA Through Software Installation in Rutherford County Schools

NASHVILLE – A seven-count indictment unsealed Friday charged two Danville, California men with conspiracy to defraud the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of more than $300,000, announced Acting U.S. Attorney Mary Jane Stewart for the Middle District of Tennessee. 

Anthony Gigliotti, 74, the CEO of Autonomic Software, Inc., (Autonomic) was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, three counts of mail fraud, and three counts of wire fraud.  Alexander Gigliotti, 36, the Vice President of Autonomic, was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  Both were arrested by U.S. Marshals in Danville, California on Friday and will appear in the Middle District of Tennessee at a later date for further proceedings. 

According to the indictment, Autonomic was a software company located in Danville, California, which provided a variety of software to private and public sector organizations.  In 2016, Autonomic installed power management software in Rutherford County school systems, in connection with TVA’s EnergyRight program, an incentive-based program designed to save energy and reduce costs through the installation of energy-saving software.  To be eligible for the energy conservation funds, customers were required to pay a portion of the software materials costs.

Instead of following the program requirements, Autonomic represented to the Rutherford County School District that schools would not incur any costs associated with the software installation.  Following the installation of the software, Autonomic submitted 47 invoices, totaling $588,240 to Lockheed Martin, the contract administrator of the EnergyRight program.  The invoices were made out to Rutherford County Schools and represented that each school incurred costs associated with Autonomic’s software installation.

Alexander Gigliotti also sent an email to a Lockheed Martin representative in support of seeking the incentive payments from TVA, with a breakdown of an invoice regarding purported costs incurred by Rutherford County Schools, claiming that the school paid $22 per computer related to software and $8 per computer related to support.  In fact, Rutherford County Schools did not incur any costs associated with any invoice from Autonomic.  Lockheed Martin then mailed incentive payments to Autonomic that corresponded to each invoice.

The Autonomic software failed to function as initially represented and approximately one year after the installation, Rutherford County Schools purchased energy saving software that could effectively quantify energy savings and which cost substantially less than Autonomic’s total purported materials costs.

The indictment also alleges that Anthony Gigliotti lied to TVA agents by falsely stating that Alexander Gigliotti was not involved in any of the previous TVA or school system work. 

If convicted, the defendants face up to 20 years in prison.

This case was investigated by the TVA Office of Inspector General and is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara Beth Myers.

An indictment is merely an accusation.  The defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. 

# # # # #

 

Topic(s): 
Financial Fraud
Contact: 
David Boling Public Affairs Officer 615-736-5956 david.boling2@usdoj.gov
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Open Letter To PG&E Vice President Brian Cherry

Letter to PG&E, FBI, CPUC, SAG and Walnut Creek

Dead Witness

Pete Bennett called your offices many times warning about the stolen PG&E Documents.

Saturday July 26th 2014

Mr. Brian Cherry
77 Beale Street, Room 1087
San Francisco, CA 94105

Mail Code B10C
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 770000
San Francisco, CA 94177
415.973.4977
Internal: 223.4977
Fax: 415.973.7226
Internet: BKC7@pge.com

Re: San Bruno Fire September 2010

  1. Possible Domestic Terrorism Access 
    • Valves, Gas Lines, Fuel Lines and related infrastructure information 
  2. Metcalf Station Maps 
    • Possible connection to Sniper Attack 
  3. PG&E Software Sub Contractor Dispute 
    1. Connected accidents and several attempted murders of this vendor
    2.  Ravenel Enterprises - False PG&E Projects / Internal Security Breach
  4. SharePoint Documents Stolen From Laptop
  5. Impact on my Sons 
    1. When PG&E welches on it's vendor People end homeless
      1. When you don't pay your bills it actually effects others
    2. One near fatal accident in 2005 
    3. The Perfect Arson Target for my connection to the Gas Pipeline Explosions 
Dear Mr. Cherry,

I am writing to express my concerns over the handling of my complaints in regards to following events related to payments or lack of, several hit and runs targeting this former PG&E vendor and related information connecting the 2004 Kinder Morgan Fire in Walnut Creek CA, several fires in Walnut Creek, the kidnapping of a PG&E Employee working in the same building Wiget address where project meetings were held and the near pathetic indifferent response from PG&E security, the legal department, outside legal counsel Attorney Kate Dyer and internal PG&E resources who've been fully informed about the many attempts on my life since being contracted to PG&E post explosion efforts.

Paying Your Vendors (me) vs. Leaving me to be hit by cars 

Around 9:00 AM today (7/26/14) another attempt was made to hit me in a crosswalk.  Last year my roommate was mugged resulting in severe head injury, my other roommate was David Bremer was murdered somewhere between Walnut Creek to Martinez Detention Facility (MDF)) where he was beaten to death.

He was a nice kid sad story here in Contra Costa County where we should really call this place Cold Case County as we have blacks hanging from trees back in the 80s, where little old Japanese Ladies (Fake Tip Line) burn to death on remote road,  where the Town of Lafayette Chief Christiansen refused to investigate my July 20th, 2011 accident but lest not forget I was nearly killed while working on the deadliest gas pipeline explosion in the country.

PG&E Security, Inside and Outside Counsel

A few weeks ago I visited PG&E Offices in an attempt to resolve the Ravenell issues.  My goal was to get paid but instead I was left outside with the three goons.  We'll tell the goons that once again someone tried to run me today and this time they missed again but it was close.

Outside Counsel Attorney Kate Dyer 


  1. Possible Domestic Terrorism Access 
    • Valves, Gas Lines, Fuel Lines and related infrastructure information 
  2. Metcalf Station Maps 
    • Possible connection to Sniper Attack 
  3. PG&E Software Sub Contractor Dispute 
    1. Connected accidents and several attempted murders of this vendor
    2.  Ravenel Enterprises - False PG&E Projects / Internal Security Breach
  4. SharePoint Documents Stolen From Laptop
  5. Impact on my Sons 
    1. When PG&E welches on it's vendor People end homeless
      1. When you don't pay your bills it actually effects others
    2. One near fatal accident in 2005 
    3. The Perfect Arson Target for my connection to the Gas Pipeline Explosions 

The Core Issues Are:


  • The PG&E San Bruno Gas Line Explosion 
  • A PG&E Funded software development project with Ravenel Enterprises 
  • Possible Domestic Terrorism data breach
  • The Metcalf Sniper Attack 
  • Connections between the only two deadly Northern California Gas Pipeline/Fuel Line Explosions 
  • Domestic Terrorism Links related to pipe bombs 
  • The San Bruno Fire Gas Can Man
  • The Hillgrade Ave Pipe Bomb Events - Dangerous Downstream Valve Attack 
  • The Driscoll Murders Connected to the Kinder Morgan Fire 
  • The deceased witness
PG&E's Failure to Address Complaints 
On July 20th 2011 my car was totaled enroute to Lafayette CA from Walnut Creek.  At the time I was contracted to PG&E where unknowingly possessed thousands of pages of maps, GPS, sensitive internal documents, litigation sensitive files, and was essentially by definition facing criminal imprisonment over Child Support a problem developed over issues related to persons now in Federal Prison

I'm also betting they are now key suspects in many primarily East Bay arson fires which in brief several are highlighted below


  1. Attorney Don Moats at 1776 Ygnacio Valley Road 2001
  2. August 2004 Bennett Truck Fire (arson) NB 680 Danville
  3. November 2004 Kinder Morgan 
  4. March 2010 Piedmont Fire - Pictures by SFPD Lt. David Oberhoffer
  5. Sept 2010 San Bruno Fire

There are many East Bay Fires started by molotov cocktails being tossed through businesses along with far too many restaurant fires of which several are businesses connected to my former Commercial Cabinet Shop Projects back in the 80s.


Incident Overview  


  1. PG&E High Performance Engineer 
    1. Hugh SmithSenior Performance Engineer at PG&E 
    2. His connection to a SFPD Lt. David Ober



    1. Suicide Connected to SCADA Control Expert 
    2. The San Bruno Fire Gas Can Man 
    3. PG&E Vendor Ravenel Enterprises 
      1. How did I get through your background checks 
      2. Why has PG&E ignored my concerns about this vendor 
      3. Critical PG&E Data 


    The Blogs - why they are here

    Throughout my blog you'll find references to many incidents that go far beyond the Explosions.

     I've endured pre/posts San Bruno Fire and pre Kinder Morgan Explosions.  Lafayette Police's handling of my 2011 accident which was they refused to handle it meaning no police report, no investigation and tough luck you were almost killed.

    Attacks now almost weekly



    A Mid-August 2004 Jet Fueled Arson



    Gas Transmission Group Incidents 

    Your Vendor

    Pete Bennett


    PG&E in the Gas Transmission Group as a High Performance Engineer.

    CC: City Of Lafayette
    City Of Walnut Creek Legal Department
    CHP State of California Threat Assessment Group
    Town of Danville
    CEO Michael Fleming CSAC Excess Insurance Authority (EIA)

    Jake O'Malley
    Executive Risk Manager, 1911 San Miguel Dr., #200, Walnut Creek, CA 94596, (925) 943-1100 - jomalley@mpa-nc.com


    go to top  Michael Fleming CEO
    CSAC Excess Insurance Authority, 75 Iron Point Circle, Suite 200, Folsom, CA 95630, (916) 850-7300


    Addendums

    PG&E Software Sub Contractor Dispute

    In March 2011 I was contracted to PG&E at the rate of $65 per hour to develop tracking databases in highly fluid project connected to the HydroTesting, the San Bruno Fire and Welding all of which are connected to this US Grand Jury Indictment where I personally appreciate the gusto of Senator Jerry who is out there shouting for his constituents which in contrast State Senator Mark DeSaulnier

    Coming soon . ..  Possible Domestic Terrorism Links

    Without great detail at this time there are numerous connections to the PG&E and Kinder Morgan Fire.  I've met probing PI's, probing investigators, law enforcement personnel and respective investigators who all have come to me.  The only time I reached out directly was to CAL Fire Pipeline Safety Group, then later to EBMUD who are fully informed about my position about deaths near their catastrophic event.


    Disposition of Highly Sensitive PG&E Documents Stolen From Laptop  

    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          .
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          ..
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Checklists and Templates
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Clearance Team Schedule and Assignments
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Documentation and Training Development
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Environmental
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Financials
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          General Video Photos
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Hydro-Test Program Process Manual
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Hydrotest Google Maps files
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Hydrotest Program Presentations
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Incident Command System (ICS)
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Master Test Plan-Profiles
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Operations
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Program Management Office
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Project Coordinator Assignments
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Public Outreach
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          SAFETY
    06/03/2011  11:28 AM    <DIR>          sandbox
    06/22/2013  04:28 PM    <DIR>          Schedule For Video Assessments
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          Site Locations _ Emergency Facilities
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-1 - L021A
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-10 L-105C
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-100 1816-01
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-101 1816-01
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-109 L-148
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-11 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-12 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-13 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-14 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-15 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-16 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-17 L-105N
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-18 L-107
    06/22/2013  04:29 PM    <DIR>          T-19 L-114
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-2 - L101
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-20 L-131
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-21 L-131
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-22 L-131
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-23 L-131
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-24  L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-25 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-26 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-27 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-28 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-29 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-3  L-101
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-30 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-31 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-32 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-33 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-35 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-36 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:30 PM    <DIR>          T-38 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-39 L-132
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-4 L-101
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-40 L-132A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-41 L-132A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-42 L-147
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-43 L-147
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-44 L-153
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-45 L-153
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-46 L-153
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-47 L-153
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-50 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-51 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-52 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-53 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-54 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-55 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-56 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-57 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-58 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-59 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-6 L-101
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-60 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-61 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-62 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-63 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-64 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:31 PM    <DIR>          T-65 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-66 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-67 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-68 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-69A L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-69B L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-7 L-105A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-70 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-71 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-72 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-73 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-74 L-300A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-75 L-300A-1
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-76 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-77 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-78 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-79 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-8 L-105A
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-80 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-81 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-82 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-83 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-84 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-85 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-86 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-87 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-88 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-89 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-9 L-105A-1
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-90 L-300B
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-92 L-400
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-93 L-400-3
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-95 SP-3
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-96 SP-5
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-98 1816-01
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T-99 1816-01
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T111
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T112
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T34
    06/22/2013  04:32 PM    <DIR>          T49




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